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NOTE

Comity and Computers in the Common
Market: The IBM Case
INTRODUCTION

In December of 1980, the Commission of the European Communities informed the International Business Machines (IBM) Corporation

that the Commission was initiating proceedings against it' under Article 86 of the Rome Treaty2 for alleged abuse of a dominant economic
position within the Common Market. The Commission's action was
the culmination of a formal investigation of IBM the Competition Directorate of the Commission began in July of 1974. 3 Although the
Commission did not release the statement of objections it had forwarded to IBM because of its tentative nature,4 public statements by
IBM indicated that the alleged abuses of the company's dominant posit IBM Corp. v. E.C. Commission, 32 Comm. Mkt. L. R. 93, 94 (1981).
2 Article 86 provides:
Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the common
market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common
market in so far as it may affect trade between Member States.
Such abuse may, in particular, consist in:
(a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase selling prices or other unfair trading
conditions;
(b) limiting production, markets or technical development to the prejudice of consumers;
(c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties,
thereby placing tem at a competitive disadvantage;
(d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of
supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage have no
connection with the subject of such contracts.
Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, entered in force Jan. 1, 1958, 298
U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter referred to as Rome Treaty].
3 EEC Commission Will Continue with Antitrust CaseAgainstIBM, [Jan.-June] ANTITRUST &
TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 1064, at 1031 (May 13, 1982) [hereinafter cited as EEC Antitrust
Case Against IBM].
4 "The Commission does not divulge information on cases in which it has not yet adopted a
final position." Reply of the Commission of the European Communities to Written Question No.
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tion "relate[d] to including minimum main memory in the pricing of
certain processors, providing interface information to competitors and
certain software issues."5
The European Court of Justice confirmed this description of
IBM's alleged abuses in an opinion dismissing an action brought by
IBM to halt the Commission's proceedings against it.6 The Court summarized the alleged abuses (the statement of objections received by
IBM ran to 1152 pages) as consisting of the bundling of certain products; refusal to disclose details of interface changes in new products for
use with its compatible series of computer systems until after the first
customer shipment; and refusing "to supply certain valuable software
to users of IBM computer systems unless such software is used with a
central processing unit of IBM manufacture, whether or not such unit
was supplied by IBM." 7 These practices resulted, it is alleged, from
IBM's desire "to protect its position against undertakings described as
'plug compatible manufacturers' (manufacturers of peripheral devices
with compatible plugs), which produce certain processing elements
which may be used by the central processing units produced by IBM."'
The activities characterized as abusive by the Commission9 encompass practices that IBM's competitors have challenged unsuccessfully in American courts.10 However, any penalty that the Commission
might decide to impose on IBM has the potential of having a significant
adverse impact on IBM's business practices within the United States.
Because of this, IBM supported its action to halt the proceedings with
the argument that, interalia,II the Commission's action was contrary to
2033/80, submitted by Mrs. Scrivener, Member of the European Parliament. [1981 Transfer
Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 10,303.
5 Id.
6 The Court of Justice dismissed IBM's application to enjoin or modify the Commission's
proceedings. Its decision was based on the timing of IBM's application, coming as it did before
the Commission had taken a final decision regarding the allegations against IBM. Because of the
tentative status of the Commission's position, IBM was unable to show the possibility of sus-

taining serious and irreversible damage should the action continue. IBM Corp. v. E.C. Commission, 32 Comm. Mkt. L. R. 93, 95, 99 (1981).
7 Id. at 94-95.
8 Id. at 94.
9 In response to the allegations, IBM has denied that the bundling of basic software and
disclosure of interface information are unlawful. It also says that the bundling of basic software is
an industry-wide practice and that IBM has begun to price such software separately. In regard to

the charges of bundling of main memory and the failure to make installation productivity options
available for the installation of IBM software on competitors' computers, IBM contends the Com-

mission has a flawed understanding of the nature of both products. EECAntitrust Case Against
IBM, supra note 3, at 1032.

10 See infra notes 80-82 and accompanying text.
II IBM's other claims were:
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the principle of comity in international law, t2 defined by IBM as the
principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of another sovereign. 3 The principle of comity has recently emerged as a significant
factor in decisions by United States courts in cases involving the extraterritorial application of United States antitrust laws.' 4 The renewed
sensitivity of United States courts to considerations of comity in such
cases can be seen as a response to the vehement criticism that the exercise of extraterritorial antitrust jurisdiction by the United States has
aroused abroad.' 5 Since much of this criticism has come from European Economic Community (EEC) member states,' 6 the question
raised by IBM of what role comity will play in Community international antitrust jurisdiction is especially compelling.
The fundamental conflict between the policies of competition laws,
which are concerned with markets that transcend national boundaries,
and those of the traditional territorial approach to jurisdiction, which
are derived from those boundaries,' 7 will be the focus of this note. This

conflict is manifested in the transnational application of those competition laws and in the enactment of laws designed to oppose such application. A recent trend in American decisions is to try to resolve this
conflict by reference to the doctrine of comity. Although there are a
(I) Illegality of the contested measures by reason of Commission's failure to meet minimum criteria required for a statement of objections. The lack of clarity of that statement and
the inadequacy of the periods allowed for replying to it are incompatible with the fundamental principles relating to the observance of the rights of the defence.
(2) Illegality of the decision to initiate the administrative procedure on the ground that
the decision was not taken by the Commission acting collegially or by an authority which had
validly received a delegation to do so.
IBM Corp. v E.C. Commission, 32 Comm. Mkt. L. R. 93, 95 (1981).
12 Opinion of Karl M. Meessen, Dr. iur, Professor of Public Law, International Law and European Law at the University of Augsburg, Germany, Appendix I to IBM's Answer on Admissibility, at 9 (submitted to the E.C. Commission) (a copy of this unpublished opinion is on file at the
offices of the Northwestern Journalof InternationalLaw & Business).
13 One commentator defines "international comity" as follows:
International comity, comitas gentium, is a species of accommodation not unrelated to
morality but to be distinguished from it nevertheless. Neighbourliness, mutual respect, and
the friendly waiver of technicalities are involved, and the practice is exemplified by the exemption of diplomatic envoys from customs duties. Oppenheim writes of "the rules of politeness, convenience and goodwill observed by States in their mutual intercourse without being
legally bound by them." Particular rules of comity, maintained over a long period, may
develop into rules of customary law.
Apart from the meaning just explained, the term comity is used in four other ways:
(1) as a synonym for international law; (2) as equivalent to private international law (conflict
of laws); (3) as a policy basis for, and a source of, particular rules of conflict of laws; and
(4) as the reason for and source of a rule of international law.
I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 31 (2d ed. 1973).
14 See infra notes 66-69 and accompanying text.
15 See infra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
16 See infra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
17 See infra notes 24-30 and accompanying text.
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number of convincing reasons for the Court of Justice to take this doctrine into consideration in the IBM case, in so doing the Court may

create another level of jurisdictional conflict, this time between itself
and the executive and legislative branches of Community government.

This note will conclude that because the Court of Justice may infringe
on functions allotted to other Community political organs by considering questions of international comity in the IBM case, the Court's competence to do so is called into question.' 8
This note will survey the law of the Community 9 and its member
states,20 United States law,2 ' and international law. 22 The factual aspects of the EEC case against IBM which highlight the tensions underlying the comity question in international antitrust will also be
explored.3 Before turning to these issues, however, the historical and
theoretical context of the comity question in international antitrust will
be examined.
COMITY AND JURISDICTION

The notion of comity, whether viewed as part of a threshold inquiry into the existence of jurisdiction or as a doctrine of abstention
from the exercise of jurisdiction, presupposes some colorable preexisting basis for jurisdiction.24 The most widely accepted and least controversial theory of jurisdiction is the territorial principle. This principle
recognizes a sovereign's exclusive right to legislate and enforce rules
pertaining to activity occurring within the territorial boundaries of that
sovereign. Since this right is generally perceived as being essentially
absolute,' the doctrine of comity can be seen as a necessary concommitant to the territorial principle of jurisdiction: if the sovereign's
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

See infra notes 90-96
See infra notes 34-41
See infra notes 43-46
See infra notes 60-72
See infra notes 24-29
See infra notes 76-86
Most of the following

and accompanying text.
and accompanying text.
and accompanying text.
and accompanying text.
and accompanying text.
and accompanying text.
discussion of theories ofjurisdiction is from I. BROWNLIE supra note

13.
25 Other theories of jurisdiction are exceptions to and mitigate somewhat this absolutism.
Other theories include the nationality principle (forum has jurisdiction over its nationals); the
passive personality principle (forum has jurisdiction over aliens committing crimes against the
forum's nationals, even abroad); the protective or security principle (forum has jurisdiction over
acts done abroad which affect the security of the state); and the universality principle (all forums
have jurisdiction over acts subject to universal opprobrium, e.g., murder). All forums are generally recognized to have jurisdiction over crimes under international law, e.g., breaches of the laws
of war as delineated in the Hague Convention (Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of
War on Land, with Annex of Regulations, signed Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. No. 539) and
Geneva Conventions (The Condition of the Wounded and Sick in the Field, signed July 27, 1929,
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power within its territories is to be preserved, it must not be subject to
interference by other nations.
Unfortunately, the abstract notion of a border cannot contain or
exclude all human activity and its effects, and the two categories of
behavior implied by the territorial principle (i.e., territorial and extraterritorial) do not provide an adequate conceptual framework for dealing with acts that have a transnational influence. As a result, the
territorial principle of jurisdiction has been expanded. The doctrine
which has been developed in order to reach activity initiated outside of,
yet having impact within, the territory of the sovereign claiming jurisdiction is referred to as the "objective territorial principle."2 6
The objective territorial principle has received wide approbation,
and is considered a valid basis for the exercise of jurisdiction under
international law. 7 It is also relatively uncontroversial, at least when
applied to rather simple factual situations, as when the courts of state B
exercise jurisdiction over a murderer whose victim was felled in that
state by a shot fired from state A. 8 This illustration, although the archetypal example of the objective territorial principle (judging from its
popularity among commentators), is lacking in the elegance usually expected in a legal rule. The more generally applicable verbal formulation used to define situations amenable to such a jurisdictional basis is
that state A may exercise jurisdiction over crimes occurring in state B,
so long as one of the essential and constituent elements of the crime
occurs within the boundaries of state A.29
A certain important distinction should be noted here: as long as
state A is exercising prescriptive or rule-making jurisdiction only over
activities part of which take place in state B, state B's sovereignty is not
in any important sense challenged. It is when state A seeks to exercise
enforcement jurisdiction over those activities that state B's sovereignty
is undermined. Of course, the exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction is
47 Stat. 2074, T.S. No. 847; Convention Relating to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, signed July
27, 1929, 27 Stat. 2021, T.S. No. 846). See I. BROWNLIE, supra note 13, at 296-98.
26 Similarly, the "subjective" territorial principle refers to the exercise ofjurisdiction over behavior initiated in the forum's territory, but consummated on foreign soil. Id. at 293.
27 The Permanent Court of International Justice lent its imprimatur to this principle in The
S.S. Lotus (Turk v. Fr.), 1927 P.C.IJ., ser. A, No. 10. In this case, the court found that Turkey had
validly exercised jurisdiction over the officers of a French ship that had collided with a Turkish
ship, causing the latter to sink, drowning the Turkish crew members and passengers.
28 "The classical illustration is the firing of a gun across a frontier causing a homicide on the
territory of the forum.
...I. BROWNLIE, supra note 13, at 293.
29 See, e-g., People v. National Radio Distributors Corp., 168 N.Y.S. 2d 886, 9 Misc. 2d 824

(1957).
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generally meaningless without, and is therefore usually coupled with,
the exercise of enforcement jurisdiction.
OBJECTIVE TERRITORIALITY AND ANTITRUST

The objective territorial principle first made its appearance in anti30
trust jurisprudence with Judge Learned Hand's opinion in Alcoa.
United States courts were held to have antitrust jurisdiction over foreign activities which were intended to and did have an effect on United
States foreign commerce.
The Alcoa "effects" test differs from the formulation of objective
territoriality given above in that it substitutes the constituent element of
the crime standard with an inquiry into the impact of foreign actions
on United States foreign commerce. This alteration is laudable inasmuch as it avoids the characterization problems endemic to any attempt to define the constituent elements of a crime. 3t As a result of this
alteration, however, the effects test does not exhibit the sensitivity to the
limits of sovereign power reflected in the constituent element standard's
requirement of a physical connection between the proscribed act and
the forum's territory.
One commentator has suggested that this lack of reference to territorial concerns in the effects doctrine is due to the nature of antitrust
law, specifically, its foundation in the concept of the "relevant market." 32 Such markets commonly encompass more than one nation, suggesting that, to be totally effective, antitrust law requires application
without regard to national boundaries. Although such universal application is possible only to a limited extent, the effects approach to antitrust jurisdiction does further this policy, which may also account for
its popularity among those entrusted with the enforcement of competition laws.33
30 United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945) (Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit sitting as a special court of last resort because of the inability to achieve a
quorum in the United States Supreme Court) [hereinafter cited as Alcoa].
31 Seeinfra notes 41-43 and accompanying text. Mayras might just as easily have confined his
description of an infraction of the competition laws to specific acts, and not broadened it to include the effect of those acts on the market.
32 Rahl, Antitrust and InternationalLaw as Viewed From the United States and the European
Common Market, 25 REC. A.B. CITy N.Y. 206, 222 (1970).
33 See Imperial Chem. Indus. v. E.C. Commission, 1972 C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 619, 696, 11
Comm. Mkt. L.R. 557, 607 [hereinafter cited as Dyestuffs] (submissions of Advocate General
Mayras: "Surely the Commission would be disarmed if, faced with a concerted practice the initiative for which was taken and responsibility assumed exclusively by undertakings outside the Common Market, it was deprived of the power to take any decision against them?").
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EEC

The Commission first displayed its enthusiasm for the effects doctrine in the Aniline Dyes Cartel case.34 In that case, the Commission
fined nine companies for their role in a price-fixing scheme involving
the aniline dyestuffs market. 5 Three of these companies, Imperial
Chemical Industries, a British firm, and Geigy and Sandoz, two Swiss
firms, were based in non-EEC countries. The Commission based its
jurisdiction over these companies on the effects doctrine. To support its
adoption of that doctrine, the Commission relied on language in Article
85(1) of the Rome Treaty prohibiting all agreements, decisions, and
concerted practices whose effect is to prevent, restrict, or distort competition within the Common Market. 6
The Court of Justice did not, however, adopt the effects basis for
jurisdiction as suggested by the Commission. Instead, it relied on a

"single economic unit" theory whereby the acts of the foreign compa-

nies' subsidiaries located within the Common Market were imputed to
the parent because the subsidiaries were deemed to have no autonomy.

The parents could then be seen as having acted within the territory of
the Common Market, allowing jurisdiction to be based on the territorial principle.3 7 In subsequent cases dealing with both Articles 85 and
86, the Court of Justice has relied on the "single economic unit" basis

of jurisdiction and has not, contrary to some reports, 38 adopted the ef34 Id. at 696, 11 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 607.
35 Re Cartel in Aniline Dyes, 8 Comm. Mkt. L. R. D-23 (1969).
36 The Commission stated:
The competition Rules of the Treaty are... applicable to all restrictions of competition
which produce within the Common Market effects set out in Article 85(1). There is therefore
no need to examine whether the undertakings which are the cause of these restrictions of
competition have their seat within or outside the Community.
Id. at D-33.
Article 85(l) of the Rome Treaty provides:
The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common market: all agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of the undertakings and concerted
practices which may affect trade between member States and which have as their object or
effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the common market, and
in particular those which:
(a) directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any other trading conditions;
(b) limit or control production, markets, technical development, or investment;
(c) share markets or sources of supply;
(d) apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties,
thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage;
(e) make the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of supplementary obligations which by their nature or according to commercial usage, have no
connection with the subject of such contracts.
Rome Treaty, art. 85(1), supra note 2.
37 Dyestuffs, 1972 C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 619, 665, 11 Comm. Mkt. L. R. 557, 629.
38 Recent Developments,.4ntitrust:British Restrictionson Enforcement of ForeignJudgments-

Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, c.11, 21 HARV. IN'I. L. J. 727, 732-33 n.36 (1980)
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fects doctrine. 9
This is not to suggest, however, that the effects doctrine is dead in
the Common Market; the Court of Justice has not explicity rejected the
doctrine.'4 Moreover, while the Court could probably apply the single
economic unit approach to the IBM case, the fact that the Commission
has made its complaint against the United States parent, and not its
European subsidiary, may indicate that the Commission is again advocating the effects doctrine.41
Although the Court has avoided the controversy that would probably have ensued had it adopted the effects doctrine, the single economic
unit theory still allows it to reach foreign centered conduct.42 Consequently, the comity issues raised by IBM will be valid no matter what
theory of jurisdiction is used in that case. The Court's reluctance to
accept the effects doctrine would, in fact, seem to support IBM's contentions, inasmuch as it implicitly reflects the Court's sensitivity to
problems created by a too aggressive extraterritorial application of
competition laws.
THE INFLUENCE OF MEMBER STATE LAW

In deciding whether or not to adopt the doctrine of comity as part
of the jurisdictional jurisprudence of EEC competition law, the Court
43
of Justice will turn first to the law of the Community member states.
From this source, the Court will discern two ostensibly conflicting signals. On the one hand, there are the competition laws of the member
states. For the most part, these laws are to be applied to restrictive
("mhe Court of Justice for the EEC has interpreted Article

85(1)... as embodying the economic
effects doctrine.").
39 Norton, The European Court of Justice Judgement in United Brands; ExtraterritorialJurisdiction and4buse of DominantPosition, 8 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 379, 392 (1979).
40 Id.
41 "[T]he Europeans had a choice of either bringing the case against IBM Europe or bringing

it directly against the parent company, IBM U.S. They chose to bring it against the parent company, so they have engaged in their own form of extra-territoriality." Causes, Solutions To InternationalDisputes,4reAssessedby Former,4ntitrustOfficial, [Jan.-June] ANTITRUST & TRADE REG.
REP. (BNA) No. 1014, at AA-6 (May 14, 1981) (interview with Joel Davidow).
42 Norton, supra note 39, at 392 n.32 ("Although circumventing the 'effects' doctrine, the
Court reached the same conclusion with its single enterprise doctrine. Moreover, the Court

avoided major international reactions against a broad extension of the extraterritorial jurisdiction
doctrines.").
43 Two commentators state:
Treaties, like the rules of public international law, are influenced by the rules of municipal
law. More than that they are derived from the laws of the six founding states. It is natural,
therefore, that the Community Court should turn for guidance to the laws of the member
states.
D. LASOK & J. BRIDGE, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW AND INSTITUTIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COM-

MUNmITIs 95 (2d ed. 1976).
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practices no matter where the offending parties are located, within or
without national boundaries, so long as the activities of those parties
have some impact on the relevant internal markets.' On the other
hand, there are the laws enacted by some of these same states which are
designed to protect against the intrusion of foreign, and particularly
United States, antitrust laws.n5 Complementing these latter laws are
statements made to the United States Justice Department protesting the
46
extraterritorial application of American antitrust laws.
Although these dissonant strains may be attributed to a failure of
the involved nations to practice what they preach,4 7 less cynical attempts have been made to harmonize them. One notable example is
44 Advocate General H. Mayras stated:
The German Statute of 1975 [GWB]... applies "to all restrictions on competition which
have an effect.., in the territory in which it is applicable (i.e. that of the Federal Republic
of Germany) even if such restrictionsresultfrom acts performed outside that territory."
In France the prices ordonnance of 30 June 1945 and the unfair competition ordonnance
of 25 September 1962 make a distinction between dominant position, where there is a monopoly situation or a clear concentration of economic power, which must exist on the internal
market, and the prohibition of cartels which does not involve any limitation of that nature.
On several occasions the Technical Committee on Cartels, compulsorily consulted by the
Minister of Economic and Financial Affairs before the bringing of any judicial proceedings,
has applied that statute to foreign undertakings.
The territorial effect criterion is applied by the Belgian Statute of 27 May 1960 against
abuse of economic power...
Section I of the Dutch Statute on economic competition of 16 July 1958 ... has been
interpreted. . . as follows: "To avoid any misunderstanding, it is to be noted that the nationality of the members of a cartel operating in Holland or of those who hold a dominant position on the Dutch market is of no importance." (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted).
Dyestuffs, 1972 C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 665, 688-89, 11 Comm. Mkt. L. R. 557, 595-97 (submissions of
Advocate General H. Mayras). See also I. BROwNLIE, supra note 13, at 300 ("It must be noted
that anticartel legislation in Austria, Denmark, and the German Federal Republic imitates the
American [effects] doctrine.").
45 Countries which have enacted laws to protect against the intrusion of foreign antitrust laws
include EEC member states France, Holland, and the United Kingdom; and non-member states
Finland, India, Norway, Sweden, and the Canadian Provinces of Ontario and Quebec. Eflis,Antitrust and InternationalLaw as Viewedfrom the UnitedStates and the European Common Market,
25 REC. A.B. CiTY N.Y. 206, 220 (1970).
46 Countries which have publicly protested extraterritorial application of United States antitrust laws include EEC member states France, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Denmark, and
Ireland. Non-EEC protesting states include Canada, Finland, India, and Japan. Id. at 219.
47 Another instance of inconsistency in a different but related area of EEC jurisdictional policy is noted in Collins, PersonalJurisdictionof the European Community-Some Comments on the
Application of Civil and Penal Jurisdiction, 17 COMM. MKT. L. REV. 487, 488 (1980):
The 1968 Convention [on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in the E.E.C.]
does two things which are of interest in [the context of comity]. As between E.E.C. members
it limits the exercise of certain bases of jurisdiction, which are categorised as exorbitant, but
as against non-E.E.C. members, it extends them. As regards the first point, when it comes
into domiciliaries the following bases of jurisdiction (interalia): the notorious Article 14
French jurisdiction based on nationality of the plaintiff; the German and Scots jurisdiction
based the mere presence of the defendant, however short the period. But as regards nonE.E.C. domiciliaries, the jurisdiction will be extended....
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the argument made by Advocate General H. Mayras in theAniline Dyestuffs case in support of the effects doctrine.48 In his submissions to the
Court of Justice in the Dyestuffs case, Advocate General Mayras downplayed the effects doctrine's "interventionist" potential by noting that
the national courts applying it generally require a "direct and substantial" connection between the proscribed foreign conduct and the internal economy.49 He also made the cogent suggestion that these "direct
and substantial" effects be viewed as providing the "essential and constituent element of a crime" necessary to trigger the objective territorial
principle." This is an intriguing assertion and, although no doubt
meant to make the effects doctrine more compatible with the territorialist viewpoint, it acknowledges, albeit implicitly, the irrelevance of the
border-bound conceptualism of the territorialists to the market issues
which are the subject of competition laws.'
In order to complete his portrait of the effects doctrine as simply
another facet of the objective territorial principle, the Advocate General had to explain the "anti-antitrust" laws" enacted by member states
that seem so unalterably opposed to this doctrine.5 3 He suggests that
such laws are, in fact, compatible with effects-based prescriptive jurisdiction, and that the object of those laws is to protect only against effects-based enforcement jurisdiction. 4 In other words, these nations
are willing to tolerate foreign adjudication of issues arising from domestic conduct, so long as the remedies granted have no "coercive"
impact within the legislating nation's boundaries.
One such non-coercive remedy, Mayras suggests, is the fines the
Commission levied against the defendant companies in the Dyestuffs
case. 5 Those fines, he asserts, satisfy the policies behind both the effects doctrine and the anti-antitrust laws because they punish the foreign conduct without challenging the sovereignty of the nation on
whose territory the conduct took place. To support this analysis,
Mayras draws a distinction between "[t]he imposition of a pecuniary
penalty to punish anticompetitive conduct" and "a decision sanctioned
byfine to obtain communication of certain documents or which would
48
49
50
51
52

Dyestuffs, 1972 CJ. Comm. E. Rec. 665, 11 Comm. Mkt. L. R. 557.
Id. at 693, 11 Comm. Mkt. L. R. at 603-04. See also 1. BROWNLIE, supra note 13, at 302.
Dyestuffs, 1972 C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 665, 694, 11 Comm. Mkt. L. R. 557, 604.
See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
Advocate General Mayras refers to such law as "counter-legislation." Dyestuffs, 1972 C.J.

Comm. E. Rec. 665, 694-95, 11 Comm. Mkt. L. R. 557, 605 (submissions of Advocate General H.
Mayras).
53 See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
54 Dyestuffs, 1972 C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 665, 694-95, 11 Comm. Mkt. L. R. 557, 605.
55 Id. at 695, 11 Comm. Mkt. L. R. at 606.
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constitute a means of pressure to obtain the annulment of certain
clauses considered unlawful."5 6

The validity of this distinction depends on the absence of any coercive potential from the former class of fine. Mayras, however, acknowledges that a fine to punish anti-competitive conduct may also
serve "to prevent (the conduct's) continuance and renewal."57 This admission makes it apparent that the principal distinction between the
is that one is explicitly coercive, while the other is
two types of fines
58
so.
tacitly
only
Perhaps it is too much to expect to be able to reconcile the competing goals of the effects doctrine and the anti-antitrust laws with one
form of remedy. When it is shown that there is no such thing as a noncoercive fine, Mayras' attempt at such a reconciliation fails. Indeed to
suggest that the conflict between the two policies can be resolved by
remedies which punish conduct but exert no pressure toward its cessation is in fact to ignore the conflict: either the policy of the effectg doctrine must prevail through remedies that reach foreign conduct
deleterious to the domestic economy, or the policy reflected in the antiantitrust laws must prevail because of the ineffectiveness of'the remedy.
Therefore, it appears inevitable that any effective attenf15i to apply national competition law to transnational markets, whicji is the essential
purpose of the effects doctrine, will involve a certain amount of trammeling upon the territorial interests reflected in the anti-antitrust laws.
Mayras' flawed analysis leaves us with a sense of the tenacity of
the problem of resolving these conflicting policies. It also shows, however, that there is a common thread of restraint which does, to a certain
extent, unify the two policies. This restraint is seen in the direct and
substantial connection which is a prerequisite in most forums to the
application of the effects doctrine, and in the delineation of a specific
group of interests to be protected by the anti-antitrust laws, as opposed
to those laws having a blanket applicability to foreign competition
56

Id. (emphasis in original).

57 Id.

58 See E.G. Official Promises Heevy Fines For Firm Violating Competition Laws, [Jan.-June]
ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. No. 995, at A-3 (Jan. 1, 1981):

Companies engaged in obvious offenses of the European Community's competition laws
can expect much higher fines in the future, according to an EC enforcement official.
Outlining the Competition Directorate's new 'get tough' policy in an exclusive BNA interview on December 5, Restrictive Practices Director John Ferry stressed: 'Deterrence is
now the order of the day.'
The Commission revised its policy on fines when it was realized that many companies
engaging in blatant anticompetitive practices regard Commission penalties as 'little more

than a parking fine.'
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law.59

It appears, then, that the message the Court of Justice will ultimately distill from analysis of member state law is that the tension between the policies of extraterritoriality and protectionism is
unavoidable, but that both policies should be pursued with as much

restraint as possible. A principled model of effectuating this restraint
has appeared in embryonic form in recent decisions in the United
States.
COMITY IN UNITED STATES ANTITRUST

Early in the history of the United States antitrust laws, courts construed the laws to apply only within the national borders of the United
States.6 0 This conservative jurisdictional policy was decisively broadened by Judge Learned Hand in Alcoa.6 1 Judge Hand based jurisdic-

tion over a Canadian aluminum manufacturer that participated in a
Swiss-based aluminum cartel on the effects of that manufacturer's anticompetitive behavior on the United States market, although none of
that behavior occurred in the United States.6 2

Other courts were quickly influenced by and eager to apply this
jurisdictional rule. In the Swiss Watchmakers case,63 the zeal of the
court in decreeing extensive alteration of the subject industry led to the
intervention of both the United States and Swiss governments. 64 Reli59 Dyestuffs, C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 665, 695, 11 Comm. Mkt. L. R. 557, 605 ("It will also be
noted that the counter-legislation adopted in France as in Holland and in other countries is aimed
basically at prohibiting their own nationals from submitting to inquiry and supervision and to
orders imposed by foreign authorities."). See also Recent Development, supra note 38, at 730

n.31:
[The Protection of Trading Interests Act] is similar to past measures in that it restricts compliance with foreign pretrial discovery procedure and protects British defendants from liability
in foreign courts for acts which would be permissible under British law. Unlike past measures, however, the Act is also aimed at countering the consequences of treble damage awards
rendered against British defendants.
(footnote omitted).
60 See, e.g., American Banana v. United Fruit, 213 U.S. 347, 356 (1909) (Justice Holmes,
speaking for the Court, said: "The general and almost universal rule is that the character of an act
as lawful or unlawful must be determined wholly by the law of the country where that act is
done.").
61 Alcoa, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
62 Id. at 443-44.

63 United States v. Watchmakers of Switz. Information Center, Inc., 133 F. Supp. 40
(S.D.N.Y. 1955).
64 Norton, ExtraterritorialJurisdictionof U.S. Antitrust & Securities Law, 28 INT'L & COMP.

L.Q. 575 (1979):
[Tihe district court found that the basic agreements constituting the Swiss watchmaking industry, which had been in effect since the early 1930's, evidenced a conspiracy to restrain such
commerce that as such, the basic agreements were contrary to United States antitrust laws.
Prior to direct negotiations between the Swiss and United States Governments with respect to
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ance on the effects doctrine by United States courts prompted criticism
and protest from other governments, and led them to enact laws to protect their citizens from certain aspects of the extraterritorial application
of the antitrust laws.65
Courts in the United States have begun to respond to this intense
reaction to their exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction. In Timberlane
v. Bank of America,6 6 the Ninth Circuit employed a three part approach for finding subject matter jurisdiction over foreign activity.
After first establishing that the alleged conduct affected or was intended
to affect the foreign commerce of the United States, the court asked
whether the conduct was of sufficient magnitude to be cognizable as a
violation of the Sherman Act. Answering these two questions affirmatively, the court then considered whether, as a matter of international
comity and fairness, the extraterritorial jurisdiction
of the United States
67
should be asserted to reach that activity.

The court listed seven criteria dealing with different facets of the
possible conflict between United States and foreign interests that it decided must be considered in making this latter determination. 68 Findthe terms of the final judgment, the district court had not only issued sweeping injunctions
against the two main Swiss associations of watchmakers, but had also directed its order to
Swiss entities which had never been served in the case. The court further provided that its
decree applied to all persons in active concert with any defendant that had actual notice of it.
The decree of the district court also imposed a wide prohibition on contracts made in Switzerland, governed by Swiss law and relating to the manufacture and sale of watches and watch
parts in Switzerland, to the extent that such contracts restricted production anywhere in the
world outside Switzerland.
After the direct intervention of the Swiss Government with the U.S. Department of State
and Department of Justice, important changes were made in the final judgment, including the
insertion of a provision that nothing contained in it would limit or circumscribe the sovereign
right and power of the Swiss Government to control and regulate its own domestic or foreign
commerce or to apply regulations to the watchmaking industry.
65 See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
66 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976). The case involved an embargo by the Honduran government
on some of Timberlane's assets imposed at the behest of a creditor of Timberlane in order to

protect that creditor's security interest in the assets.
67 4ntitrust ExtraterritorialJurisdiction Under the Effects Doctrine-A ConflictsApproach, 46
Fopm. L. REv. 354, 358 (1977).
68 The criteria are:
(1) the degree of conflict with foreign law or policy,
(2) the nationality or allegiance of the parties and the locations or principal places of business of
corporations,
(3) the extent to which enforcement by either state can be expected to achieve compliance,
(4) the relative significance of effects on the U.S. as compared with those elsewhere,
(5) the extent to which there is explicit purpose to harm or affect American commerce,
(6) the foreseeability of such effect, and
(7) the relative importance to the violations charged of conduct within the U.S. as compared
with conduct abroad.
Timberlane v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597, 614 (9th Cir. 1976).
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ing the record incomplete as to these issues, the court remanded the
case to the district court for determination of the comity question.
A similar list of factors to be reviewed in deciding whether the
exercise of jurisdiction is consistent with the comity doctrine was
promulgated by the third circuit in ManningtonMills, Inc. v. Congoleum

Corp .69 However, in remanding the case to the district court for development of a fuller record, the Court of Appeals stated that the comity
issue should determine whether or not the court should abstain from
exercising otherwise valid jurisdiction. The court's analysis thus differed from that in Timberlane, where comity was viewed not as an abstention doctrine but rather as a threshhold jurisdictional question.70
Comity considerations are a recent and, as yet, unsettled element
of the jurisdictional analysis for applying the United States antitrust
laws. 7' The Justice Department, however, has and will continue to
consider comity when determining whether or not to bring an antitrust
action.72
Because of certain basic differences between the policies underly69 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979). The action questioned the validity of patents obtained in 24
different countries. In addition to adopting all of the Timberlane criteria, with the exception of
one (relative significance of the effects on the United States compared to effects elsewhere), the
court listed for consideration the following: (I) availability of a remedy abroad and the pendency
of litigation there; (2) possible effect upon foreign relations if relief is granted; (3) whether a party
will be placed in the position of being forced to perform an act illegal in either country or be
under conflicting requirements by both countries; (4) whether an order for relief would be acceptable in this country if made by the foreign nation under similar circumstances; and (5) whether a
treaty with the affected nation has addressed the issue. Id. at 1297-98.
70 Friedler, Antitrust Law-ExtraterritorialJurisdiction-CourtMust Consider International
Comity in ExercisingJurisdiction UnderSherman Act, Mannington Mills v. Congoleum Corp., 595
F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979), 4 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L.J. 185, 195 (1980) ("Only the Manningion
court has suggested that international comity is an abstention doctrine in the realm of international antitrust law.").
71 See KraftAntitrustLaw: Extraterritoriality- In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation (Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Twenty-nine Foreign & Domestic Uranium Producers), 5 Trade Reg. Rep.
(CCH) T 63,183 (7th Cir. Feb. 15, 1980), 21 HARV. INT'L L.J. 515, 518 (1980), where the author
suggests that the Westinghouse court "narrowly construed the substantial effects analysis [in
Timberlane] as reaffirming the Akcoa intended effects test and regarded the further [comity] balancing inquiry employed in Timberlane as mere dictum."
72 Joelson, Challenges to UnitedStates Foreign Trade and Investment: Antitrust Law Perspectives, 14 INT'L LAW. 103 (1980). According to Joelson:
A recent speech by another Antitrust Division official noted that the Division has long abided
by the balancing test [of Timberlane] in determining whether to prosecute and that "the interdependence of the world economy and legitimate interests of foreign sovereigns must be considered in private as well as public antitrust enforcement under American law."
Application of U.S. Law Will Be Modffed by Justice DepartId. at 112. See also Extraterritorial
ment, [July-Dec.] ANTTrrRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 1030, at A-3 (Sept. 3, 1981). (Attorney General William French Smith expressed Justice support of court consideration of foreign
government's interest in international cases).
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ing United States and EEC competition law,7 3 it is uncertain what in-

fluence the recrudescence of comity in American antitrust law will have
on the Court of Justice when it considers the issue. The problems cre-

ated by the extraterritorial application of competition laws are not peculiar to such application of the Sherman Act, however,7 4 and coping
with them in a manner akin to that gaining currency in United States

courts would appear preferable to ignoring them. Action by the Court
of Justice also seems called for since no international organization has

yet made a substantive contribution to the resolution of these
problems.75
COMITY ISSUES RAISED BY THE

IBM

CASE

The need for Community adoption of some method to deal with
the problems of extraterritorial jurisdiction is most persuasively illustrated by examining the EEC action against IBM in light of the criteria
developed by United States courts for use in deciding the comity issue.
Since the interests weighed in addressing this question may be expressed in a number of ways, no definitive list of criteria has been or is

likely to be agreed upon. The formulation in Timberlane, Mannington
Mills, and section 40 of the Restatement (Second)of United States Foreign Relations Law each emphasize slightly different facets of the com73 Grendell, The Antitrust Legislation of the UnitedStates,the EuropeanEconomic Community,
Germany and Japan, 29 INT'L & COMP L.Q. 64, 74 (1980). Unlike the United States laws, the
competition laws of the EEC do not define a class of per se illegal activities. This reflects a willingness on the part of the Community to look beyond the impact an activity has on competition
for some other justification for that activity (e.g., allowing concentration of a domestic business in
order to enhance the foreign trade posture of that business). United States courts generally look
no further than the competitive impact of an activity.
74 See, e.g., J. CUNNINGHAM, THE COMPETITION LAW OF THE EEC 72 (1973) ("The United
Kingdom does not accept the 'effects' principle as made clear in the Aide Memoire submitted to
the Commission by the United Kingdom Government in connection with the Aniline Dyes case.").
75 There have been a number of attempts in this direction, however. See Norton, supra note
64, at 596. Norton states:
Implementing its 1967 recommendation respecting voluntary consultation and cooperation
among antitrust officials of the member States, the OECD Council recommended in 1973 that
every member State, which considered itself injured by the restrictive trade practices of an
enterprise situated in another member country, should consult with the appropriate governmental authorities of the latter. If the two countries cannot reach a mutually satisfactory
solution, they may submit the dispute for reconciliation to the OECD's Committee of Experts
on Restrictive Practices, comprising antitrust officials from 22 OECD countries.
See also Recent Developments, Antitrust Law.- United Nations Guidelines-Restrictive Business
Practices, U.N. Doc A/Res/35/60 (1980), 22 HARV. INT'L L.J. 405 (1980). The author notes that
"[oin December 5, 1980 the United Nations General Assembly adopted a resolution establishing
guidelines for the development and implementation of an international antitrust code." Id. "[The
Set of Multilaterally Agreed Principles and Rules for the Control of Restrictive Business Practices]
avoids the issues of the jurisdiction of national antitrust laws." Id. at 410.
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ity issue, but there is a generic similarity underlying all of them.76 In
the following analysis, all three definitional approaches will be
represented.
The allegations against IBM involving its alleged failure to release
interface redesign information to its competitors have significant international implications;77 this analysis of the comity issue will, therefore,
focus on them. It should also be noted that the following discussion
presupposes a decision by the Commission compelling IBM, through
direct order or oppressive monetary penalty, to release such information to its competitors in a manner adequate to obviate the competitive
advantage IBM is alleged to enjoy. As pointed out above,78 any other
kind of relief would be of little aid in vindicating EEC competition
policy and also would not implicate issues of international comity.
While the locus of the disputed conduct is the fundamental threshhold inquiry in the comity issue, concern with the extraterritorial nature of that conduct does not end there. Because determination of the
comity question is essentially a matter of balancing domestic and foreign interests in the subject conduct, the degree to which such conduct
can be said to be based in the foreign jurisdiction, in more than simply
the physical sense, is of utmost importance. To discern the strength of
this connection, suggested criteria include the relative importance of
foreign and domestic conduct to the alleged violation, and the nationality of the parties.79 Applying these criteria to IBM's conduct--decisions made by a United States company within the United States and
effectuated there-confirms that the conduct is centered in the United
States.
The nationality of the parties is also looked to in determining
where the dispute is centered. While the Commission's status as one of
those parties adds an international character to the dispute, this character is diluted by the fact that the Commission's action was prompted, in
part, by Memorex SA,80 an affiliate of Memorex U.S. Memorex U.S.
76 Section 40 of the RESTATEMENT

(SECOND) OF

FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED

STATES (1965) lists the following considerations:

(I)

the vital national interest to each of the states, (2) the extent and nature of hardship

which inconsistent enforcement would create for the involved parties, (3) the extent to which
the required conduct is to take place in the territory of the other State, (4) the parties' nation-

alities, and (5) the State's ability to enforce compliance.
77 See infra notes 83-88 and accompanying text.
78 See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
79 See supra notes 68-69, 75.
80 "By an order of 13 May 1981 the Court allowed Memorex SA, a company incorporated
under Belgian law, which had lodged a complaint against IBM with the Commission, to intervene
in the case in support of the conclusions of the defendant." IBM v. E.C. Commission, 32 Comm.
Mkt. L. R. 93, 95 (1981).
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brought an unsuccessful antitrust action in the United States against
IBM. Although a factual determination regarding the domination of a
subsidiary by its parent should precede the attribution of the subsidiary's action to the parent because of the lack of real autonomy in the
subsidiary, application of the Court of Justice's "single economic unit"
analysis"' to the involvement of Memorex SA in the EEC case against
IBM could lead to the conclusion that such involvement is a means by
which Memorex SA's American parent is pursuing its complaint
against IBM. Such a conclusion would reinforce the perception that
manifestation of an essentially
the Commission's action is a European
2
United States-centered dispute.1
The place where any remedial acts are to occur is another important factor in the decision on the exercise of jurisdiction. Since IBM's
compliance will consist of either paying fines to the Community or releasing the desired information to its European competitors, that place
of performance is ostensibly on Community "turf." It should be
remembered, though, that any remedy decided on by the Commission
and approved by the Court will have as its object the modification of
conduct centered in the United States. As the jurisdiction which is being considered is based on the domestic effects in Europe allegedly occasioned by IBM's conduct in the United States, it would be
inconsistent not to take notice of the externalities created by the required "domestic" conduct.
This is especially true when the effect in the United States of the
putatively European conduct involves the compromise of profitable
business practices based within the United States and found not to violate United States competition laws. Such is the case with IBM's practice of not revealing changes in interface design to competitors in
advance of the first shipment to customers. In a number of civil actions
brought against IBM by its American competitors in the peripherals
market, this practice has been found to be permissible under United
States antitrust law. In California Computer Products v. IBM,8 3 the
81 See supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
82 Another ramification of Memorex's involvement in both the American and European actions against IBM is the violation of the maxim, ne bis in idem, the notion that a person should not
be tried twice for the same act. Although IBM is not being exposed to "double jeopardy" in a
strict sense because of the differences between United States and EEC law, the possibility that
Memorex's involvement in the EEC action gives to it a second chance against IBM would appear
to run contrary to the fundamental notion of fairness informing the "double jeopardy" doctrine.
See Causes, Solutions to InternationalDisputes Are Assessed By FormerAntitrust Official, supra

note 41, at AA-6-AA-7 ("[tOne can see the [IBM] case as a kind of second chance, Le., American
plaintiffs losing a case in the U.S., taking another shot at it by becoming complainants in the
Common Market.").
83 613 F.2d 727, 744 (1979).
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court found that, even assuming IBM was a monopolist, IBM "was
under no duty to help CalComp or other peripheral equipment manufacturers survive or expand," and, to this end, IBM was not obliged to
tailor "its product development ... to facilitate sales of rival products."' The loss by IBM of incentive to invent if it were deprived of
the lead time needed to recoup product development costs was noted
by the court in Memorex Corp. v. IBM." The court in this case also
observed that the requested disclosures "would reveal valuable information about the design of the products. ' 6 Any disincentive to technological improvement8 7 runs contrary to the goal of free competition
to promote an efficient market, which implies provision of the best
product at the lowest price. Ordering IBM to make the requested disclosures, then, would have the potential of adversely affecting not only
IBM's legitimate (as determined by United States courts) business interests,8 8 but also the proper functioning of the market for computer
technology.
While it is possible that the release of information to IBM's European competitors would not compromise the competitive advantage
IBM enjoys in the American market through the withholding of that
information, it is more likely that IBM's competition in Europe would
enter the American market, or would communicate such information to
an American affiliate. This is clearly a possibility in the case of
Memorex.
Analysis of IBM's conduct, the dispute arising from it, and the
impact of the remedial steps that the Commission and the Court might
require in response to it, indicates that the IBM matter is essentially an
American concern. This impression is reinforced by consideration of
yet another of the factors suggested by United States jurisprudence on
84 Id.

85 458 F. Supp. 423, 437 (W.D. Cal. 1978), aJt'd, 636 F.2d 1188, (9th Cir. 1980).
86 Id.
87 See also Transamerica Computer Co. v. IBM Corp., 481 F. Supp. 965 (N.D. Cal. 1979)
(since the challenged design changes by IBM had some purpose other than excluding competition
in the peripherals market, no relief was granted to Transamerica); Telex Corp. v. IBM Corp., 510
F.2d (10th Cir. 1975) (Telex alleged that IBM's refusal to disclose interface design changes violated the Sherman Act; IBM successfully counterclaimed for misappropriation of trade secrets).
88 See Baxter Urges EC Competition OfficialsNot to ForceInterfaceDisclosuresby IBM, Jan.June] ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 42, at 278 (Feb. 4, 1982):
[Assistant Attorney General William F.] Baxter warned [Manfred Caspari, Director General
of the Directorate General for Competition] that requiring IBM to disclose its computer
software interface specifications would adversely affect U.S. exports. Any order requiring
such a solution for alleged anticompetitive activities in Europe would have worldwide consequences and would constitute a 'quasi confiscatorial' action highly unfavorable to the U.S.
trade position, Baxter recounted in an interview with BNA.
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the comity question: the pendency of litigation abroad. 9
Although the currency of IBM's assertion that its activities are already subject to judicial proceedings in the United States is diminished
somewhat by the Justice Department's decision to drop its thirteen year
old suit against IBM, this decision should have little effect on the deliberations by the Court of Justice. For IBM's assertion to influence the
Court, the Court would have to acknowledge the primacy of the decisions of the United States judiciary as they pertain to activity on United
States soil. From the perspective of European deference to this jurisdiction, any decision that might have come in the Justice Department's
action against IBM would have been a superfluity: such a decision
would have no more legitimacy, in spite of its increased scope, than the
decisions in Memorex, CalComp, or Telex.
WHITHER COMITY?

The above analysis indicates that, in light of the criteria which
American jurisprudence suggests should be utilized in considering the
effect of comity on extraterritorial jurisdiction, there are compelling
reasons for the Court of Justice to decline to exercise its jurisdiction
over the IBM matter. Assuming that this analysis is correct and the
United States interest in the IBM case outweighs the interest of the
Community, the Court may nevertheless be constrained to hear the
case and reach a judgment on the matter, including, if the merits of the
case indicate, ordering the requested disclosure.
The comity issue, by its nature, arises in dilemmas which involve
governmental functions that have been traditionally allocated exclusively to different branches of government. Judicial deference to foreign interests can, thus, result in jurisdictional conflicts on a level
different from the jurisdictional conflict which provoked it. Such deference usurps the legislative function by vindicating policies other than
the ones required by the legislature to be vindicated, while the failure
to so defer may result in encroachment upon foreign relations policy,
traditionally the preserve of the executive. The delicate balancing of
competing national interests necessary to resolve the disputes arising
from the extraterritorial application of antitrust laws is probably beyond both the capacity and political competence of the judiciary in
both the EEC and the United States. 90
The problematic nature of any judicial excursion into the realm of
89 See supra notes 59-60, 67 and accompanying text.
90 Although some tempering of the effects doctrine is clearly appropriate, the judicial appli-

cation of comity is a less than ideal solution. Comity is in the eye of the beholder and any
long list of factors, such as those in Timberlane, is simply an open invitation to the court to
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foreign policy was noted in a recent critique of the comity analysis suggested by the court in Timberlane.9 1 The author suggests that although
the factors listed by the Timberlane court92 seem to constitute a principled method of balancing domestic and foreign interests, the efficacy of

their application is questionable. For example, even if a court were
able adequately to discern and characterize the policy of the foreign

sovereign (an endeavor likely to antagonize that foreign sovereign), the
Timberlane analysis gives no guidance as to where that policy should
stand in relation to United States policy. Should this analytical hurdle
be overcome and a court decide that foreign interests ought to

predominate, the author notes that, as traditionally understood, "comity [should not be practiced] if doing so would be contrary to [the forum] nation's interests or policy.

93

The logistic and diplomatic difficulties inherent in any attempt to
define and weigh the policies of a foreign sovereign would be present in
any such effort by the Court of Justice. The institutional framework
created by the Rome Treaty would also lead one to conclude that it is

beyond the power of the Court94 to subjugate Community policy to the
concerns of the United States.
It can be seen that, when hearing the IBM case, the paramount

concern of the Court will be the underlying policy of the Rome Treaty,
which is the promotion and cultivation of the Community economy. 95
decide for itself... It is doubtful that courts should take on executive branch responsibility

by making that type ofjudgment.
ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP.(BNA) No. 1034, at A-18-A-19 (Oct. 8, 1981) (William F. Baxter,
Assistant Attorney General, head of the Antitrust Division).
91 Kadish, Comity andthe InternationalApplicationofthe ShermanAct: Encouragingthe Courts
to Enter the PoliticalArena, 4 Nw. J.INT'L L. & Bus. 130 (1982).
92 See supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
93 Kadish, supra note 91, at 133.
94 See, e.g., Schwartz, Article 235 and Law-making Powers in the European Community, 27
INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 614 (1978). Schwartz states: "Where a power is expressly conferred upon a
Community institution by the EEC Treaty, that power remains vested solely in that institution,
not only in relation to other Community institutions, but also vis-a-vis the governments of the
member States acting jointly." Id. at 622-23. Schwartz also notes that the Commission is the only
body which can make proposals "to protect the Community's interests and its laws." Id. at 62526.
In regard to the Commission position on comity, see ABA Institute Examines Pitfalls ofInternationalAntitrustEnforcement, ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 1039, at A-14 (Nov.
12, 1981). This articleis a report on a speech by Frans Adriessen, one of the EEC Commissioners
responsible for competition policy, to the ABA National Institute on Critical Issues in International Antitrust and Unfair Competition Law given on November 6-7, 1981 in Washington, D.C.
The article states: "There is also no basis under principles of comity, he added, for concluding
that one country has a duty to give way to another and to 'abandon control of conduct which
violates its laws.'" Id.
95 CommentAntitrust Law of theEuropeanEconomic Community: An InterpretationofArticles
85 and 86 of the Treat of Rome, 4 INT'L TRADE L. J. 251 (1979). This author states:
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The condition of the European market in computers will, therefore,
carry more weight before the Court than IBM's pointed challenge of
the Community's extraterritorial reach. The clear policy of the Treaty
must have dispositive influence over the Court which derives its power
from that Treaty, no matter the international controversy that might be
provoked by decisions bowing to that influence.
In a sense, then, the limits of the power of the judiciary to engage
in executive or legislative capacities is what is put into sharpest relief by
the Commission's action against IBM. Although the consideration of
comity-related issues by the courts may help avoid exacerbating these
disputes, their ultimate resolution must be reached through diplomatic
96
exchange.
CONCLUSION

The Commission's action against IBM raises once again the issue
of the proper role for the doctrine of international comity in actions
involving the extraterritorial application of competition laws. Application to the IBM case of the criteria developed by United States courts
in dealing with the issue indicates that United States interests in the
dispute may very well outweigh those of the Community. The fact that
any effective remedy prescribed by the Court of Justice must have as its
aim ending profitable activity by IBM already found to be legal by
United States courts makes this especially clear. Because deference to
United States interests usurps to a degree legislative power not reserved
to the Court, there is some considerable doubt whether it is within the
power of the Court to so defer. It would, therefore, seem incumbent
upon the governmental organs charged with the forumlation and execution of the foreign policy of the interested parties to reach a resolution of this and other similar disputes.
Terrance L. Bessey
Free and unimpeded competition is not the purpose of the EEC law, but rather is a tool to
achieve its goal. That goal is an improved standard of living among the member states, promoted in part by greater market integration. Where competition inhibits growth, however,
the former must give way. This balancing process is the essence of European Community
antitrust law.
Id. at 251.
96 See Kadish, supra note 91, at 171. Kadish states: "If [extraterritorial] enforcement gives
rise to problems in the international sphere, then these difficulties are best handled by the political
branches of government, not the courts." Id. There is some indication that the political branches
of the two governments are, in fact, taking care of such difficulties. See also EEC.4ntitrustCase
Against IBM, supra note 3, at 1030. (United States Justice Department and EEC Commission
"actively discussing" IBM proceeding). But see id. ("Frans Andriessen, the EEC commissioner
responsible for competition policy... commented: 'Given the complexity of the case, I think
there are several more years to go before it is completed.' ").

